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Because the person in pain is ordinarily so bereft of the 
resources of speech, it is not surprising that the 
language for pain should sometimes be brought into 
being by those who are not themselves in pain but who 
speak on behalf of those who are. 
 
Elaine Scarry (The Body in Pain 6) 
 
No se puede mirar. One cannot look at this. Yo lo vi. I 
saw it. Esto es lo verdadero. This is the truth. 
 
Francisco Goya, The Disasters of War (DV epigraph) 
 
Francisco de Goya‘s testimony to trauma, The Disasters of War (1810–
20), is conditioned by the paradox of bearing witness; it insists on its 
own horror, insists that that horror exceeds the viewer‘s empathic 
capacity, and insists that the generalised ‗one‘ avert their gaze, while at 
the same time it swears to an individual act of seeing by the ‗I‘, and by 
the eye, of the artist. As the epigraph to Pat Barker‘s novel Double 
Vision (2003), that paradox works at the novel‘s threshold, so that like 
Goya‘s work, Double Vision refuses the possibility of being read, and 
refuses to be read even while being read, even as it demands to be read. 
Both Goya‘s and Barker‘s work figures, that is, an ethical dilemma of 
tremendous contemporary importance: the representation of trauma and 
violence. These visual and literary texts consider not only what it means 
to see violence, but the ethical and social implications of the ‗re–
presentation‘, the repeated presentation, of physical and psychological 
pain. This essay is concerned with precisely this dilemma as it is 
considered in Double Vision, not only in terms of the various 
relationships between art and violence the novel posits, but the ways in 
which this arises as a dilemma for the novel itself. This essay argues that 
Double Vision is self–reflexively concerned with its own relationship to 
violence, with its own representation of violence, and with what art 
might be able to offer in this context beyond the possibility of 
redemption. I want to suggest that it is in that relationship that Goya‘s 
work describes, that relationship between seeing and demanding, 
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between vision and voice, that Double Vision figures the representation 
of violence as necessarily engaging the witness in a testimonial dialogue 
with the violent event itself. Art does not only mediate; just as Kate and 
Stephen notice the noise of Goya‘s paintings, suggesting that far from 
being silent images, ‗they absolutely roar at you‘, I want, in this essay, to 
think about how Double Vision roars at the reader but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, about the way in which art demands that the witness 
roar back (DV 154). In other words, this essay suggests that Double 
Vision is perhaps most powerfully concerned, in this context, not only 
with representation but with reception: with response and with 
responsibility. 
Double Vision demonstrates Barker‘s development of a 
multiplicitous vision within her writing: what Sharon Carson has called 
Barker‘s ‗compound eye‘.(45). Her pre–1990 novels, for example, 
construct dialogic narratives of the lives of working–class women, and 
since then, her fiction has continued to figure a disturbing postmodern 
engagement with world–changing historical events. Her most recent 
three novels, in particular, as Elaine Showalter has recognised, are ‗more 
self–reflexive and self–critical‘ — they explore the role of art and of the 
artist under the influence of terrifying global and personal traumas, 
embedded in the apparent security of the everyday. This, in Double 
Vision, includes the events of September 11, 2001, which Bruce B. 
Lawrence describes as ‗the milestone of violence for the twenty–first 
century‘ (1). Barker‘s use of the Bakhtinian dialogic has been 
acknowledged (Hitchcock), but Double Vision figures a development of 
that earlier novelistic heteroglossia. That is, it seems to me that the task 
of Double Vision is not only to give voice to those marginalised by the 
dominant discourse, as was the case in Barker‘s earlier work, but to 
analyse the ways in which the artist sees and subsequently represents 
these communal voices and thus undertakes the responsibility of bearing 
witness. Kate, Stephen and Ben all struggle with the ethical 
representation of trauma and war so that Double Vision‘s task seems to 
be to unpack such problems of representation and the role of the artist in 
communicating or bearing witness. But the novel does not romanticise 
the role of the artist, or the power of art to right the world‘s wrongs. 
Rather, the emphasis is on what is represented, on ways of seeing and 
embodying violence and trauma, and specifically, on methods of bearing 
witness to contemporary issues: the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
Gulf War, and the events of September 11. 
The novel not only figures an ethical debate concerning the 
representation of trauma and violence in a creative work by considering 
the patterns of this process for its artists — the sculptor, Kate; the 
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photographer, Ben; the journalist, Stephen; the author, Peter — but is 
itself one such work of art. Those internal debates, those internal dialogic 
relationships, are thus also figured by the novel itself in its engagement 
with and of the reader. It is ultimately in that engagement with the 
reader, the novel insists, where responsibility lies. The inclusion of a 
reading list in the ‗Author‘s Note‘ at the end of the novel thus not only 
situates the novel within a wider discourse on violence and 
representation, but works to endow responsibility upon the reader, a 
reader who can act. The present essay, then, seeks to extend the work of 
for example, John Brannigan, Sarah C.E. Ross, and Sharon Monteith and 
Nahem Yousaf, who have all noted the intersections of art, violence, and 
redemption in the novel and in Barker‘s work more widely. For Monteith 
and Yousaf, for example, hope and despair are, in Double Vision, almost 
inextricable (297); for Ross and for Brannigan, too, the conclusions of 
this novel and of Barker‘s earlier Border Crossing (2001) display what 
Brannigan terms a ‗cautious optimism‘, and a ‗qualified‘ sense of 
‗happiness‘ (151, 162), or what is for Ross an ‗always tempered‘ 
consideration of ‗regeneration, redemption, resurrection‘i(140). For these 
critics, and for Brannigan in particular, that tension between hope and 
despair, between redemption and violence, is a creative rather than a 
curative tension — what we might term, I think, a dialogic production of 
art (Brannigan 163). But it is precisely the ways in which this 
relationship underpins a creative production that in turn makes demands 
upon the audience or the reader, with which this essay is concerned. The 
essay will inflect an understanding of Barker‘s writing as redemptive 
through a consideration of other ways in which Double Vision self–
reflexively engages with the representation and the reception of 
psychological trauma and physical violence in art, in continuation of the 
exploration of the relationship between art and violence which Barker 
had already begun in her Regeneration trilogy (1991–95), and which she 
has since taken up again in her most recent novel, Life Class (2007). 
Double Vision begins quietly: Kate Frobisher, an artist, already 
destroyed emotionally by the violent death of her husband, war 
photographer Ben, fills her days with sculpture and mourning. Barker 
jolts the narrative with Kate‘s sudden car accident — the novel‘s first act 
of violence — which leaves her frail and unable to work on her latest 
commission, a large sculpture of Christ; for this reason, she employs 
Peter Wingrave, the church gardener, to assist her. The novel‘s second 
plotline — which forms one of its many figurations of a ‗double 
vision‘.— focuses on Stephen Sharkey, a recently divorced foreign 
correspondent who has moved to Kate‘s quiet village in order to write a 
book on representations of war. He too is mourning the death of Ben 
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Frobisher, with whom he had worked closely on several assignments — 
it was he who found Ben‘s corpse after he was shot by a sniper in 
Afghanistan. The two artists of Double Vision, both reeling from the 
same loss, and in whom global and personal traumas are entwined, thus 
provide a medium for the exploration of the creative representation and 
reception of terror, war, and destruction. 
Double Vision‘s redemptive or regenerative strategies are perhaps 
most clearly displayed by the way in which all of the central characters 
are forced to create new lives from the remains of the old. In particular, 
Peter has been given a second chance, a second identity and the 
opportunity to redeem himself. Peter is recognisable as the latest 
incarnation of the murderous child seen in two of Barker‘s earlier novels, 
Border Crossing and Another World (1998). Peter‘s chillingly 
destructive past seems at first dichotomous with his idyllic creative 
present, his role as gardener and artist‘s assistant. His short stories, 
however, entwine the two: these textual creations confront Stephen with 
their disturbing visions of destruction. These stories have ‗no moral 
centre‘, and it is this very ‗ambiguity in the narrator‘s attitude to predator 
and prey…that [makes] the stories so unsettling‘ (DV 162). That lack of 
‗moral centre‘ suggests that the stories make no demand upon the reader; 
that Peter‘s texts, like Peter himself, are sociopathic, unable to anticipate 
(even blind to) the response of the other. No dialogue, no capacity for 
response, exists between Peter‘s texts and the reader. As Stephen 
recognises: 
 
You bring everything you are, everything you‘ve ever 
experienced, to that encounter with the sculpture, the 
painting, the words on the page. But behind the smoke 
the sibyl crouches, murmuring too low for you to catch 
the words, ‗Ah, but I don‘t mean what you mean‘. 
(DV.163) 
 
That resistance to any engagement with the witness is what figures the 
story‘s lack of a ‗moral centre‘. But moreover, it is the witness‘s failure 
to recognise the consequent disjunction between ‗meaning‘ and 
interpretation which makes them, like Andrea (the character in Peter‘s 
story), not only ‗complicit‘ in their own destruction, but in the 
(re)production of violence (163). Both the artist and the audience, 
Double Vision seems to suggest, are necessary elements in this ethical 
project of responsibility. This lack of ‗moral centre‘ to Peter‘s stories 
echoes the behaviour of Stephen‘s nephew, Adam, who has been 
diagnosed with Asperger‘s Syndrome, explained by Justine — Adam‘s 
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nanny and Stephen‘s lover — as ‗a sort of difficulty in seeing other 
people as people‘ (83). In other words, both Adam and Peter appear to 
suffer from an inability to empathise, to put the self in the place of the 
other: to put into practice a double vision. In this way, Adam also 
mirrors Gareth from Another World, and Danny Miller from Border 
Crossing. Yet, the sunshine–filled painting Adam gives as a gift to 
Justine after she is attacked indicates the possibility that this cycle of 
recurring or regenerative evil might be broken, precisely because this 
work of art is designed to elicit a response — of determination, of 
inclusivity, and of course of joy — from its recipient. 
Such a possibility, however, is always tempered; Double Vision is 
nowhere so resolutely optimistic as to suggest that art alone is 
redemptive in the face of trauma. A child‘s cheery image of sunshine and 
domesticity, ‗the scene every child paints: a house with a smoking 
chimney, curtains at the windows, a tree in the garden, Mum, Dad, child, 
dog standing on the lawn, and behind them all, filling the whole sky, an 
enormous, round, golden sun‘, figures a parody of art that fails to paint 
the whole picture, that cannot include, in this household scene, the 
possibility of a ‗meaningless, brutal, random eruption of violence‘ (254, 
260). If, as Brannigan asserts, the way in which Peter and Adam ‗serve 
to illustrate the ethical problems of failing to see others as others‘ is 
‗intimately connected with the ways in which the novel explores the 
problems of representing war, for Stephen‘s concern is precisely about 
when the image of war objectifies the other, and fails to represent the 
other as human‘, then it might be seen that it is the very difficulty of that 
struggle between the self and the other, the inside and the outside, the 
domestic and the ‗brutal‘, the relationship between violence and 
redemption, that not only does Adam‘s painting figure, but that Double 
Vision posits in its consideration of the ethical processes inherent in art 
as a medium of communication (Brannigan 158). 
Any consideration of redemption or regeneration across Barker‘s 
work is unsettled by such considerations of the role of the artist and the 
contemporary representation of trauma. Leo Bersani proposes that  
 
…such apparently acceptable views of art‘s 
beneficently reconstructive function in culture depend 
on a devaluation of historical experience and of art. 
The catastrophes of history matter much less if they are 
somehow compensated for in art, and art itself gets 
reduced to a kind of superior patching function, is 
enslaved to those very materials to which it 
presumably imparts value. (Bersani 1) 
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What I want to suggest is that, in Double Vision, the purpose of the 
representation of violence is not to be a ‗patch‘, to heal or to alleviate, as 
Justine believes. Rather, it seems to me that the artistic representation of 
violence in Double Vision seeks to introduce a dialogue between the 
violence and the witness. For example, engravings of Green Men cover 
the roof of the church in Double Vision, representing the punishment 
exacted on Celtic enemies: their heads were cut off and their mouths 
stuffed with green leaves. Kate says of these engravings: ‗A symbol of 
renewal, people said, but only because they didn‘t look.… No, she 
thought…they were wonderfully done — some anonymous craftsman‘s 
masterwork — but they were figures of utter ruin‘ (DV 29). Kate 
recognises that considering this artwork as redemptive reduces its impact 
and overlooks the artist‘s intentions for an unflinching representation of 
terror. Double Vision thus insists upon the importance of looking and of 
responding, so that we might move beyond the ‗devalu[ing]‘ image of 
redemption or rebirth and instead face trauma (and, indeed, let it 
face.us). 
‗Contemporary historical literature‘, argue Peter Middleton and Tim 
Woods, ‗has become an extremely active sphere of argument about 
history and the rediscovery of its elided potentialities, as well as an often 
highly conflicted struggle over what should be remembered and what 
forgotten‘ (1). Yet what contemporary literature of memory wrests with 
seems to be a question of not merely what but how we should remember: 
how should the past be represented, made available for witnessing, and 
subsequently witnessed, and what happens in that act? Double Vision 
explores the shadowing of the present by the past and the persistent 
recurrence of traumatic images of war that strain against the apparent 
tranquillity of peacetime. Memories, in this novel, always threaten; they 
‗[bulge] above the surface‘, and ‗[build] behind the thin membrane of 
everyday life‘ (DV 13, 89). Double Vision‘s artists work through their 
own physical pain and memories of trauma in order to understand and 
permanently represent the pain of others. It is in this way that, as 
Monteith has noted, ‗Barker investigates the effects of memorialising, 
and it is not finally to monuments that Barker turns: many of her most 
profound and painful concerns are inscribed on the bodies of the living‘ 
(55). For example, both Stephen and Kate are troubled by the irruption 
of traumatic memory at that vulnerable, liminal moment between waking 
and sleeping; indeed, their recognition of the way in which these 
memories press against their bodies and their daily lives may be one 
reason they seek to control or channel them through art, and it is perhaps 
because the novel‘s artists are affected by and respond to trauma and 
violence in this way that their art makes such claims on its audience. 
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Moreover, the artist‘s own experience of trauma may be seen as a way of 
bridging the gap between the representer and the represented and thus of 
forging an intersection between personal memory and communal history. 
As a mediator between violence and representation, then, the task of the 
artist, Double Vision suggests, is to assist us to see; to cease to be blind 
or numb to the images with which we are bombarded in a media–
saturated society, images and narratives which rely on shock to sell 
news.
1
 If, as Stephen thinks, it is ‗not true…that images lose their power 
with repetition, or not automatically true anyway‘, it is precisely that 
ability to repeatedly shock, he acknowledges, which figures the image‘s 
power and, moreover, its ethical function (DV 155). It is, then, not only 
vision, or bearing witness, of which Double Vision is concerned to 
emphasise the importance, but revision, the capacity to review and to 
respond over and over (Monteith and Yousaf 283, Brannigan 154). Not 
only must we look, acknowledge, bear witness to trauma but, Double 
Vision asserts, one role of the artist is to make us look, and look again, in 
a subsequent act of regarding which figures the ethical dilemma of 
representing violence: the simultaneity of the desire to resist the irruption 
and continuation of pain, and the need to represent accurately and to 
witness violence. 
Yet the problem that the text and characters repeatedly come up 
against is the very impossibility of the representation of trauma and of 
pain; the impossibility for the artist to grasp and then to represent, to 
speak for, to bear witness to, the pain of another. As Elaine Scarry points 
out, ‗when one speaks about ―one‘s own physical pain‖ and about 
―another person‘s physical pain‖, one might almost appear to be 
speaking about two wholly distinct orders of events‘: 
 
For the person whose pain it is, it is ‗effortlessly‘ 
grasped (that is, even with the most heroic effort it 
cannot not be grasped); while for the person outside the 
sufferer‘s body, what is ‗effortless‘ is not grasping it (it 
is easy to remain wholly unaware of its existence; even 
with effort, one may remain in doubt about its 
existence or may retain the astonishing freedom of 
denying its existence; and, finally, if with the best 
effort of sustained attention one successfully 
apprehends it, the aversiveness of the ‗it‘ one 
apprehends will only be a shadowy fraction of the 
actual ‗it‘). So, for the person in pain, so incontestably 
and unnegotiably present is it that ‗having pain‘ may 
come to be thought of as the most vibrant example of 
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what it is to ‗have certainty‘, while for the other person 
it is so elusive that ‗hearing about pain‘ may exist as 
the primary model of what it is ‗to have doubt‘. Thus 
pain comes unsharably into our midst as at once that 
which cannot be denied and that which cannot be 
confirmed. (Scarry 4) 
 
Scarry here touches on the tension at the heart of narratives of witness: 
the need for the ‗sufferer‘ to share the ‗certainty‘ or ‗truth‘ of their pain, 
while simultaneously, it remains impossible for a person outside the 
experience to ever fully know that truth, to ever ‗grasp‘ or to ‗apprehend‘ 
that which evades understanding. What representations of violence and 
of trauma must negotiate is that which is ‗unsharable‘, yet strangely 
sharable, recognisable: how is the pain of another best represented, best 
understood, best responded to? What is emphasised, in Scarry and in 
Barker, is ‗effort‘. Witnessing, reading, is work, work which enables the 
production of meaning, the production of truth. Double Vision, I think, 
seeks to demonstrate, in form and in content, art‘s demand for a listener, 
for a dialogic counterpart, as well as the need for that effort. The novel 
explores how we, like Adam, might seek to overcome the painful gap 
between self and other, the ‗suppression of difference‘ which marks the 
‗violence of representation‘ (Armstrong and Tennenhouse 8). 
Double Vision takes up Goya‘s insistent cry, ‗[t]his is the truth‘, 
along with the ethical debate of how this ‗truth‘ might be shown — and 
of what such insistence on truth might produce. Stephen, especially, is 
preoccupied by Goya‘s etchings of the Napoleonic Wars, collectively 
titled The Disasters of War. The purposes and problems of Stephen‘s 
book on war photography and the ways in which Stephen sees Goya‘s 
ideas to influence — to be ‗squatting all over‘ — his work also point up 
their function for Double Vision (DV 57–58). Stephen says of Goya: 
 
It‘s that argument he‘s having with himself, all the 
time, between the ethical problems of showing the 
atrocities and yet the need to say, ‗Look, this is what‘s 
happening‘…and I thought, My God, we‘re still facing 
exactly the same problem. There‘s always this tension 
between wanting to show the truth, and yet being 
sceptical about what the effects of showing it are going 
to be. (DV 119) 
 
As the medium between the event and the audience, the artist is 
constantly required to make ethical decisions on what should be seen, 
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and indeed, how such horrors could be adequately conveyed. But 
perhaps more importantly, Goya and Barker are again concerned not 
only with the representation of ‗the truth‘, but with the ‗effects of 
showing it‘, with the ‗ethical problems‘ not only of the art itself, but of 
an audience. As in Scarry‘s discussion, it is the problem of truth and, 
indeed, of truthfulness, which recurs in Double Vision. If Goya‘s art 
seeks to represent the horrors of war and trauma accurately, realistically, 
truthfully, that truthfulness is precisely a condition of the relation of a 
narrative to an audience. That is, as Slavoj Žižek has made clear, we 
must distinguish  
 
…between (factual) truth and truthfulness: what renders 
a report of a raped woman (or any other narrative of a 
trauma) truthful is its very factual unreliability, its 
confusion, its inconsistency. If the victim were able to 
report on her painful and humiliating experience in a 
clear manner, with all the data arranged in a consistent 
order, this very quality would make us suspicious of its 
truth. (Žižek 3) 
 
Truthfulness, the discourse or means of telling, must uphold, then, 
‗(factual) truth‘, or the story: form must underscore content in ethical 
acts of witnessing. The artist is not only tasked with making it possible 
for the audience or reader to see the act of violence, but for it to be 
represented, made present again, relived. As Scarry makes clear, ‗the 
most crucial fact about pain is its presentness and the most crucial fact 
about torture is that it is happening‘ (9). Truthfulness thus exhibits the 
difficulty of moving beyond the traumatic event as it discursively 
renders the sense in which trauma is always and everywhere ‗now‘. The 
ethical art of violence must therefore perform a continual 
(re)experiencing of the unspeakable traumatic event, difficult (even 
impossible) as that may be, and even though this may also mean the 
reinscription of violence in the world: ‗Art must bear witness to horror‘, 
Brannigan asserts, ‗even when that responsibility brings its own 
costs‘.(155). 
Life Class continues to debate this ethical dilemma as it undertakes 
an analysis of ‗the ways in which the wounds of war are represented — 
or, more often, hidden‘ (LC 248). The role of the war artist, believes the 
novel‘s protagonist, Paul, is to show unflinchingly its atrocities. Fellow 
artist Elinor, however, disagrees; why, she asks, should a gallery include 
paintings of the war wounded? 
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‗Because it‘s there. They’re there, the people, the 
men. And it‘s not right their suffering should just be 
swept out of sight‘. 
‗I‘d have thought it was even less right to put it on 
the wall of a public gallery. Can‘t you imagine it? 
People peering at other people‘s suffering and saying, 
―Oh my dear, how perfectly dreadful!‖ — and then 
moving on to the next picture. It would be just a freak 
show. An arty freak show‘. (LC 175–76) 
 
Elinor refuses to bear witness to the war, seeming to believe that to do so 
is to give in to the ‗bully‘: ‗More than anything I resent the way the war 
takes over all our lives. It‘s like a single bullying voice shouting all the 
other voices down‘.(116). War, suggests Elinor, is monologic, opposing 
the dialogic discourse and novelistic heteroglossia upheld in, for 
example, Barker‘s own art. But for Paul, to sweep aside the war is to 
sweep aside those for whom the war is a fundamental part of their voice; 
the war is their ‗something to say‘. In this way, dialogism must 
necessarily include such artistic representations, must include all voices, 
even that of the ‗bully‘. ‗Showing‘, for Paul, does not mean the kind of 
exploitative performance (putting on a ‗show‘, a ‗freak show‘) Elinor 
anticipates, but rather suggests the ‗rightness‘ of bearing witness to those 
men that are ‗there‘ — to Scarry‘s continuing ‗presentness‘ or 
‗happening‘ of pain and violence. 
But art, Elinor insists, should address a chosen subject, that which is 
not, like the war, ‗passive‘, ‗imposed on us from the outside‘ (176, 244). 
Like Justine who, foreshadowing Elinor, refuses to watch, to ‗gawp‘ at, 
the representations of violence paraded before her each night on the 
news — ‗with a lot of this there‘s nothing anybody can do except gawp 
and say, ―Ooh, isn‘t it awful?‖ when really they don‘t give a damn‘ — 
for Elinor, it is ‗ignor[ing]‘ the war, the interruption of pain, which 
represents an ethical choice in relation to her own human rights (DV 140, 
LC 176). In this way, Elinor‘s refusal to connect or to come into dialogue 
with violence and war differs from the inability of Double Vision‘s 
Adam and Peter to see ‗other people as people‘. The only reason to 
regard violence, Justine and Elinor suggest, is in order to ‗do something‘ 
about it; if participation cannot be positive or alleviatory, it should not be 
attempted at all. Any other kind of viewing, Susan Sontag has suggested, 
approaches voyeurism: ‗Perhaps the only people with the right to look at 
images of suffering of this extreme order are those who could do 
something to alleviate it — say, the surgeons at the military hospital 
where the photograph was taken.— or those who could learn from it. 
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The rest of us are voyeurs, whether or not we mean to be‘ (37–38). It is, 
in fact, such insistence on detachment, ‗the right not to be harassed…to 
remain at a safe distance from others‘, which Žižek identifies as that 
which is insisted upon as ‗the central human right in late–capitalist 
society‘i(35). Justine and Elinor figure this refusal to become a spectator 
of violence, to engage in the voyeurism of trauma and its visual 
reproduction, and demonstrate this distancing of violence from the realm 
of ‗civilisation‘. But even though Barker herself has noted that both 
Double Vision and Life Class are described by a ‗much more overt than 
normal preoccupation with how things should be represented, with the 
ethics of representation, rather than the ethics of action‘, I want to 
suggest that the two are not so easily separated, and that it is, finally, to 
the ‗ethics of action‘ that Double Vision turns.(‗Interview‘ 370). For 
example, Justine‘s refusal to engage with violence is manifested in 
another way when she balks at the detectives‘ discussion of ‗your 
attacker‘ (DV 267). Such terms of ownership, she thinks, ‗opened the 
door on to a small dark room, a space so cramped it could hold only two 
people, herself and her attacker‘ (267). But Justine‘s assertion of her 
‗right not to be harassed‘ ultimately undermines that detachment as even 
this demands dialogue with her attacker. That is, it is her consequent 
determination to look around that ‗small dark room‘, in spite of the 
threat, ‗Don‘t look. Don‘t turn round‘, that figures the kind of ‗ethics of 
action‘ she and Elinor advocate (267). Most importantly, the novel 
seems to suggest that such action cannot be chosen, as Justine and Elinor 
seek to do. It is precisely such ‗ethics of action‘, I think, which Double 
Vision ultimately demands of its characters and of the reader: an ethics 
of response, of responsibility, of ‗doing something‘. 
In Double Vision, this crisis of responsibility is most powerfully 
explored in the context of the violent image which frequently returns to 
Stephen during the nightmares and flashbacks which characterise his 
Post–Traumatic Stress Disorder. He and Ben had, in Sarajevo, 
discovered a young girl who had been raped and murdered, and Stephen 
is later horrified to discover that Ben had returned to photograph the girl 
in her original state: 
 
He gaped at the print, unable to understand why it was 
there. Obviously Ben had gone back the next morning, 
early, before the police arrived, to get this photograph. 
He‘d restored her skirt to its original position, up round 
her waist. It was shocking. Stephen was shocked on her 
behalf to see her exposed like this, though, ethically, 
Ben had done nothing wrong. He hadn‘t staged the 
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photograph. He‘d simply restored the corpse to its 
original state. And yet it was difficult not to feel that 
the girl, spreadeagled like that, had been violated 
twice. (121) 
 
It was Stephen who had interfered with the scene, who touched the 
violated body, if only to endow her with dignity — Ben merely, as 
Stephen recognises, ‗restored the corpse to its original state‘. Yet what is 
so offensive to Stephen is that Ben has moved beyond the ostensibly 
objective role of the foreign correspondent, and become not simply a 
voyeur, but one who recreates, restages, the violent act. In Barker‘s 
narratives, this figures the difference between ‗gawping‘ and ‗gaping‘, 
between voyeurism and bearing witness to horror, in which, as Alison 
Sinclair says of Goya, the work shows the artist not as ‗a witness 
exulting in the violence, but shocked by it‘ (78). For Stephen, Ben‘s 
restaged photograph means that he is no longer a spectator, one who 
represents violence, but one who is complicit in the violent act itself, as 
in the photograph which includes his own shadow, an image which ‗says 
I‘m here. I‘m holding a camera and that fact will determine what 
happens next‘ (DV 123). But although it might be seen that representing 
violence, in this case, means that Ben has become a perpetrator, a 
‗disseminat[or]‘, complicit in the crime, it is also possible, I think, to 
identify in Ben‘s work not only an ‗ethics of representation‘ but an 
‗ethics of action‘.2 The ‗double vision‘ of Ben‘s eye and the lens of his 
camera means that Ben is at once artist and audience; he not only records 
the violent image, but is the first to respond to it, to engage with it, and 
those two acts ‗will determine what happens next‘. The camera thus not 
only becomes a tool for representation, but the surveying lens itself 
enables an ethical act; the camera thus becomes a doubled site of 
responsibility. But above all, Ben‘s photographs and, indeed, Double 
Vision itself, work as disseminators: partly and problematically, as Ben‘s 
photograph of the girl in Sarajevo makes clear, as disseminators of 
violence, and as Kate recognises, as disseminators of response.— 
‗Photographs shock, terrify, arouse compassion, anger, even drive people 
to take action…it was impossible to feel anything as simple or as trivial 
as despair‘ (DV 152–53). But most importantly, the art in and of Double 
Vision works to disseminate responsibility. 
This shift between the artist and the audience is also demonstrated 
when Kate is repeatedly required to imagine how her work will be 
viewed, made public, even lying on the floor to gain perspective (68–
69). And the shift is made clear again when Stephen finds Ben‘s corpse, 
and lying beside him, sees what Ben had seen:  
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Nothing here but stones and rocks. But then Stephen 
looked up and saw them, the wrecked tanks. He‘d been 
driven past them twenty times perhaps, but he hadn‘t 
spotted what Ben saw. From the bottom of the crater 
they looked like a wave breaking. A sun so white it 
might have been the moon hung in the sky behind 
them. (305)  
 
‗I want you to see what I see‘, says the artist, or witness. ‗I saw it‘. The 
photographs and the novel urge us to move beyond the ‗inability to feel‘, 
and to instead respond. Each of Goya‘s images, Sontag recognises, ‗is an 
invitation to look, the caption, more often than not, insists on the 
difficulty of doing just that. A voice, presumably the artist‘s, badgers the 
viewer: can you bear to look at this?‘.(40). Ben‘s representations of 
violence, like Goya‘s, urge us, invite us, challenge us, to see what he has 
seen, to see through his eyes, through his lens, no matter how difficult 
that might be. It is not only his responsibility to ‗speak on behalf of‘ 
those who are in pain, Ben‘s photographs suggest, but our responsibility 
to see this, to bear witness, and to respond (Scarry 6). This is, I think, the 
notion Double Vision works towards. That is, Barker suggests, like 
Bersani, that art, that literature, should allow us to engage with the other, 
to recognise the importance of our own role in this dialogic relationship 
of representing and regarding, finally made explicit in the final line of 
dialogue in the novel, ‗There.…You see?‘ (DV 307). That final ‗you‘ 
does not only figure an address from Stephen to Justine, but from the 
novel to the reader, and in the sense that it is structured as a question, 
this final imploration describes Sontag‘s ‗invitation to look‘, an 
invitation which, left open, not only creates a space of response, but 
places that very responsibility in the hands of the reader. 
Barker‘s novel Double Vision grapples with the ethics of 
representing violence, and explicitly debates the role of the artist as a 
correspondent, a ‗human mediator‘ between violent events and those at 
home, as one who testifies to the truth of pain and of trauma, who leaves 
us in no doubt (Korte, ‗Being Engaged‘ 442). Most importantly, as I 
have shown, this novel underscores the necessity and the responsibility 
of the witness as one who responds to the ethical demand of the artist, 
and who is, finally, urged to echo, ‗I saw it‘. 
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NOTES 
 
Abbreviations 
 
DV Double Vision 
LC Life Class 
 
1
 On this point, see especially Lawrence (2), Korte (‗Touched by the 
Pain of Others‘ 184), and Sontag (20). 
2
 In response to Stephen‘s assertion — ‗There are plenty of good 
reasons for being a war correspondent. Witnessing. Giving people the 
raw material to make moral judgements‘ — Justine points out, ‗But you 
said yourself, the witness turns into an audience, and then you‘re not 
witnessing any more, you‘re disseminating‘ (DV 227). 
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